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American Images of Denmark during the Cold
War
by Anders Kristian Brerholm Frikke
Preface

The study of the past is essential for our understanding of the
present day. In other words, if you want to know something about
your own time, a good place to start is to study the previous
historical events.
The Cold War is in many ways a defining event for our world
today. It was the central conflict of the post Second World War
period, and as it was fought between the only two superpowers on
earth, the United States and the Soviet Union, no nation could stay
completely neutral. Denmark is an example of a country that had to
choose sides in the Cold War, despite strong pacifist feelings in the
general public, and a history of political neutrality since the Slesvig
wars in 1848-50 and in 1864.
Denmark's strategic and political position during the Cold War is
worthy of attention because such a study can bring both knowledge
of the small state's role in the global conflict-seen from an American
point of view-and insight into Denmark's post Cold War foreign
policy. The following article will focus specifically on how the
Danish political system and the Danish decision-making were
perceived by the American presidents and politicians in Washington
D.C., during some of the most tense periods of the Cold War
between 1950 to 1968.
I want to thank the Board of Directors of the Danish American
Heritage Society, administrators of the Edith and Arnold N. Bodtker
Grant for Research or Internship, for making this study1 possible.
Their approval of my grant application provided the funds for my
research trip to the United States during the winter and spring 2005.
There I had the opportunity to collect the necessary archive material
for this project-primarily in Washington D. C. at the National
Archives II, later at several of the American presidential archives
and at the University of Copenhagen.
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I am grateful that the board decided to support what I consider to
be an important project even though it does not specifically deal
with Danish-American immigrant issues.
Introduction
Denmark has an important strategic-military and political position
in Northern Europe. The small country's geography is unique-it
could be called the delta of the Baltic Sea2 between the European
continent in the south and the Scandinavian Peninsula to the north.
This position made Denmark a relatively important and strong
empire through medieval times, and later during the last 200 years
Denmark probably only survived as a nation because none of the
great powers surrounding the kingdom, Britain, Germany and
Russia, could accept the idea that the strategic delta of the Baltic Sea
was under control of one of the other two3 -Denmark stayed
independent due to this rivalry, although Sweden got Norway after
the Napoleonic wars in 1814 and a combined Prussian and Austrian
army conquered the southern parts of the empire, Slesvig
(Schleswig) and Holsten (Holstein), in the second of the Slesvig wars
in 1864.
New technology, new types of transportation and more powerful
weapons up through the twentieth century made Denmark's
strategic position less important, but Hitler still choose to occupy the
otherwise German-friendly country, because it could strengthen the
position of his fleet and become a necessary bridgehead towards
Norway. 4
With the Second World War it became dear that Denmark would
be absolutely impossible to defend in case of a new major war. The
country is too narrow and flat and has too many inlets and fjordsthere are no natural defense lines against a large, mobile army. This
knowledge was especially explicated by the Radical Liberal Party
and the politician, P. Munch, 5 but it was also used strongly by the
Danish Communist Party as an argument to create a communist
society. The communists gained many voters on this issue, 6 and over
the years this political debate created strong pacifist feelings among
the Danes in general.

63

It is therefore not surprising that the allied powers and especially

the United States after the Second World War had an interest in, but
also a problem with, the small state in Northern Europe, Denmark.
In sum, two factors were of major importance for the understanding
of Denmark's international position after World War Two, namely
the country's military strategic importance due to its geography, and
the political system, which had a tendency to be pacifist and to quite
a large degree socialist-and right after the war even communist,
due to the party's important role in the resistance movement. In fact
during the 1950s and 1960s - in the context of some of the most tense
periods of the cold war - Denmark had an almost uninterrupted
Social Democratic rule (from 1953 to 1968) under which the country
developed into a modern, socialist inspired welfare state - quite far
from the American concept of the ideal society.
It was essential for America that Scandinavia in general and
Denmark in particular, became a part of the Western Powers after
the war, and not a vacuum of political uncertainty in Europe. This
problem became even more imminent as the Cold War slowly
emerged in the late 1940s7 because socialism and to some degree
communism, as mentioned, had strongholds in Denmark. These
problems gave birth to the important debate about whether or not
the relatively socialist Denmark could be trusted as a western allied?
This debate continues among Danish historians of the Cold War.
In the following I will present some background information on
the Danish-American relations in the period after the Second World
War, and discuss some essential research on this topic. I will hereby
narrow down my specific thesis for this investigation.
Denmark, NATO and the Cold War
The so called consensus-line-historians8 in Denmark point out that
the post Second World War relations between Denmark and the
United States were good, and without any serious reservations,
because the attitude in the Danish public during the war had been
pro-allied, British/American, and strongly against the German
occupation forces. The warm relationship in other words just
continued, and the recognition of Denmark as an allied state, and
later the NATO-alliance was the natural continuation hereof.9 This
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is, however, a very simplistic view that most likely was written with
a certain historic purpose in mind, namely the healing of the wounds
after the war, when the Danish population was more supportive of
Hitler-Germany than most people, including the historians, would
admit in the tough years following the occupation. The story that is
told by the historians today is, of course, much more complex, as I
will explain in more detail in the following part.
This study should be seen as a supplement and extension of a
central, ongoing debate about the Danish-American relationship in
the Cold War era between two leading Danish Cold War historians,
Poul Villaume and Bo Lidegaard. The debate focuses on whether
Denmark acted as a real ally, and if the Danish politicians and
population regarded themselves as conclusive NATO members and
supporters of the United States.
Villaume's thesis is that Denmark to some degree would not, and
possibly could not, become a secure and trustworthy NATO
member. Therefore he also calls his mammoth dissertation: Allied
with Reservations-Denmark, NATO, and the Cold War; A Study of
Danish National Security Policy, 1949-1961. 10 The title is, in other
words, a strong indication of his interpretation of the Danish
security policy during the period. Villaume stresses that Denmark
had one of the lowest per capita military budgets among the NATO
members-much lower than Britain and the United States
recommended-and this fact was only accepted because Denmark
had competent (maybe even sly) politicians who acted strategically
in international affairs. In this connection the so called "quite a free
hand", which the U. S. was given on the strategically important
island of Greenland (the Thule Airbase) should not be
underestimated. 11 An important part reason for this attitude in
Denmark was, Villaume underlines, that everybody knew that the
country could not be defended in case of a major war-it simply was
not part of NATO's war plan, whereas the German river Elbe or later
the Pyrenees would be the major defense lines against the Soviet
Union - all to the west of the Danish border.
Denmark's hard but unfruitful work to establish a Scandinavian
military alliance (before NATO around 1947-49) between Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, shows, according to Villaume, the strong wish
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among the Danish politicians as well as the population to stay
neutral in the slowly emerging Cold War conflict. It was in fact
Norway that more or less forced Denmark into NATO. 12
The Danish Social Democratic Party is immensely important when
dealing with this question because it was in power during most of
this period (prime ministers: Hans Hedtoft (1947-50; 1953-55), Hans
Christian Hansen (1955-60), Viggo Kampmann (1960-62) and Jens
Otto Krag (1960-68; 1971-72)). It was Hans Hedtoft who was the
warmest supporter and the most prominent designer behind the
Scandinavian defense alliance project, and it was later the Social
Democrats that ensured that Denmark did not spend more money
than necessary on the military. The Danish Social Democrats wanted
to build a socialist welfare state. This was expensive and it was
therefore natural to try to keep the defense expenses to a minimum.
This small-state, socialist view of the world was quite far from the
American interpretation of the international affairs in the 1950s and
1960s and this created tension. Villaume argues that the Social
Democratic hinterland demanded a policy that was not too NATO
friendly, but he also points out that for Prime Ministers Hans
Hedtoft and H. C. Hansen the NATO choice was the least evil, and
something they chose out of "bitter necessity". The Social Democrats
on the other hand felt that it was their duty to make the Danish
public understand and accept the need for the NATO alliance and
the internationalization of the Danish military involvement in
general. The relations between the United States and Denmark/the
Social Democratic Party were therefore somewhat tense during parts
of the 1950s, because Denmark, according to Villaume, was an ally
but with reservations.
Bo Lidegaard' s interpretation of Danish Cold War policies and
Danish-American relations is different. 13 In fact he does not disagree
with Villaume in his argumentation, but he claims at the same time
that Villaume tells us only part of the whole story. It is, according to
Lidegaard, necessary to look deeper on the more structural layers of
history to get a consistent and solid understanding of the events. In a
way Lidegaard' s interpretation is therefore more indirect, which I
will explain in more detail in the following .
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Lidegaard focuses specifically on the role of the Social Democratic
Party when he analyzes the Danish-American relations during the
period. In this connection it is important to keep in mind that the
Danish Social Democratic Party was in power in Denmark with very
few exceptions from the war ended and until the early 1980s, and
had uninterrupted rule during the period 1953-1968, which is the
period of interest here. So instead of looking on the DanishAmerican relations he analyzes Danish Social Democratic-American
relations-hence he is able to "dig" a little bit deeper than Villaume.
Lidegaard calls Denmark an American ally without reservations. 14
He claims that of course there were some tensions once in a while on
the surface over small and often unimportant problems, but that on
the deeper level there was a warm understanding between the two
countries. The global American fight against communism and the
Soviet Union could very well be compared to the daily battles the
Danish Social Democrats fought against the communists - the Social
Democrats and the Communists were bitter opponents in the Danish
parliament - and that created a connection and understanding
between the party and the U. S. administrations. It was in other
words well known in the U.S. that the best way to fight communism
in Europe was to support the Social Democrats. 15 Lidegaard's
argument is that the American administrations never really pushed
the different Danish governments, although they of course had the
political muscles to do so. It was accepted by the U.S. that Denmark
spent less money on defense and that Denmark at least officially
never accepted nuclear weapons on Danish soil - including
Greenland.
Lidegaard concludes that there was, what he calls, a strategic
alliance between the two countries. It was known in America that it
would create domestic political problems for the Social Democratic
governments if they were pushed too hard on, for example, the
defense questions-therefore the Americans did not do that. The
central point is, according to Lidegaard, that the American
administrations knew that the Danish governments would fight and
try to contain communism-which was the American Cold War
strategy at the time. 16 The two nations did agree totally on what the
United States found most important, and therefore it was possible to
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overcome some minor disagreements. Lidegaard' s thesis is,
however, as I stated above, more indirect than the one Villaume
brings to light. It is much more difficult to find evidence that
supports Lidegaard, unless you look at the broad, strategic picture
and over a long period of time-it is clear that the small "surface"
cases (Lidegaard) takes up a lot of space in the archives, and that is
what has made Villaume draw the wrong conclusions, according to
Lidegaard. Denmark was in other words an ally without
reservations.
The question that comes to mind now, is how this research dispute
can be solved? My project, as I mentioned above, can be seen as a
supplement and extension of the central, ongoing debate between
Poul Villaume and Bo Lidegaard. My scope is, however, different
than theirs. I will tum the problem 180 degrees around and try to
view Denmark from an American point of view. My starting point is
therefore the American archives and the politics of the different
American administrations during the period. What the Danish
politicians did and thought during the Cold War period is one thing,
but what the American politicians, officials and bureaucrats thought
and especially wrote about Denmark internally within the American
system is a different matter. The specific purpose of this study is
therefore to investigate how the different American administrations
perceived and assessed the Danish political development from 19501968, with a special focus on the Danish Social Democratic Party and
the creation of the welfare state. Did the different presidents and
their administrations (Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) see the Danish socialist
model as dangerous and half Soviet-communist? Or did they view
the Danish model as a secure safeguard against communism and the
Soviet block, which could possibly be used as a role model for other
states in the so-called western world?
My research provides a picture of the American attitude from
within towards one of the, seemingly, most socialist members of
NATO in Europe, Denmark. In addition to this, my research gives a
better understanding of both the role of the United States in Europe,
and the American attitude towards and "management" of the of the
European states during the Cold War.
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My primary source material consists of American embassy reports
sent from Denmark to the State Department. Occasionally officials in
Washington D.C. commented on these reports, sometimes with
proposals to American political initiatives towards Denmark.
American Images of Denmark during the Cold War
Based on my analysis the American view of Denmark's political
development from 1950 to 1968 can briefly be summarized as
follows: During the early 1950s, American evaluations of Denmark
are primarily positive. However, in some areas a wait-and-see policy
is clearly evident due to the fact that Denmark is a new and not so
well known ally, and maybe more importantly due to the somewhat
limited Danish commitment to NATO. There is, however, also a
general understanding of the fact that Danish political life is dictated
by the voters, of whom many are quite skeptical of NATO, in part
because of the earlier mentioned strong Danish tradition of pacifism.
Particularly around 1953-54 when Eisenhower takes over the
presidency, Denmark is viewed in a more negative perspective. The
weakened relationship between the two countries is caused most
likely by the rejection of an expanded NATO presence on Danish
soil. After this low in the US-Danish relations, the American opinion
of Denmark is slowly becoming more and more positive, which
seems especially apparent after H. C. Hansen becomes prime
minister during the mid 1950s. Extensive Danish welfare programs that even at a certain point result in a cut in the defense expenditures
- do not change this tendency of an improved understanding
between the two countries.
The sarhe can be said also about the 1960s. The temporary setback
occurs during Viggo Kampmann's short and hectic term as prime
minister, when the extreme political left undergoes a revival under
Socialist Folk Party (SF) leader, Aksel Larsen. This does not,
however, have any serious or long term consequences for the
generally excellent relationship between Denmark and the United
States, despite almost mandatory disagreements about the size of the
Danish NATO budget. From 1962 and onwards under Prime
Minister J. 0. Krag, Denmark is evaluated by the American
diplomats in unprecedented positive terms as a good friend who is
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able to play an ambassador role for the United States within the
international community.
My research has shown, however, that a number of factors in the
years following the Folketing election in 1966 impair the relations
between the two countries, and especially the opposition to the
American warfare in Vietnam has an important role to play in this
respect. However, the election in 1968 and the new liberalconservative government coalition that comes into power afterwards
in most ways restore the good relations. My investigation also
indicates that the above-mentioned disagreements between
Denmark and the United Stated in the second half of the 1960s are
temporary and not fundamental by nature.

***
The chronological outline above of the Danish-American relations
during the 1950s and 1960s points to four general results, which
change the image previously shown in the research about DanishAmerican relations during the cold war. I will discuss these four
points in more detail in the following:
1) The United States never questions Denmark's overall
position among the western democracies despite a strong
Social Democratic Party and a socialist inspired welfare
state. This does not mean, however, that the US-Danish
relations are always unproblematic. Especially in connection
with the size of the Danish NATO budget there are almost
mandatory disagreements, but this does not, however, seem
to have any long term effect on an otherwise generally good
relationship between the two countries. My study therefore
indicates that the Danish-American relations should be seen
in a more positive and non-intervening light than Poul
Villaume indicates in his research.
2) There is in Washington D.C. a surprisingly low interest in
Danish domestic policies that are not related to defense - for
example social laws, taxation and union policies, all which
are strongly inspired by a socialist way of thinking. There is,
however, a fair interest in the outcome of elections, and
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especially the Radical Liberal and Communist parties (and
from 1958 the Socialist Folk party, SF), due to their pacifist
policies and the strong bond between the Danish communist
party and the Soviet Union.
3) The Social Democratic Party and its policies are rarely
subject to thorough scrutiny and strong suspicion, although
they often cooperate with the Radical Liberal Party and
during the 1960s the Socialist Folk Party (SF).
4) It is to my surprise not possible to measure a change in the
attitude towards Denmark during the presidencies of
Democrats John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. There
is not a measurable difference between the Democrat and
Republican presidents, in connection with how Danish
policies are perceived-although the Republican policies
and values are further away form the Danish social
democratic way of thought than the Social Democratic Party
platform.
Denmark's Overall Position in the Cold War seen from the USA
Denmark became a member of NATO in late 1949, and the earliest
American "pictures" of Denmark I include in this investigation are
from that period-the late 1940s and early 1950s. The perception of
Demark is more a wait-and-see attitude during this period
compared to the later 1950s and the 1960s. This could be expected
due to the fact that Denmark is a new ally with a pacifist tradition.
A Policy Statement from State Department from 1949 states: " ... a
large segment of the Social Democratic Party is dubious that the
Government was correct in abandoning neutrality and adopting the
NATO philosophy." It furthermore says that the Danish people
tended toward reaffirming the former policy of neutrality, and that
the government is keenly sensitive to attacks by the Communists.17
The Truman administration probably was not afraid that Denmark
would become a communist nation, but it is also clear that the
position of the country, within the general, international landscape
was not really settled yet. If one compares this statement, with the
later policy statements and political reviews, the differences become
more distinct. The Attache from the American embassy in
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Copenhagen wrote in a paper on Danish political developments
during 1953: "In spite of becoming increasingly passive participants
in NATO, there were continued strong official expressions of
support for the organization." 18 Later he said that the Social
Democratic parties were evolving away from the doctrinaire
socialism toward a more moderate welfare philosophy, and that
there is no danger that the democratic system will be overthrown
from within by rightists or leftists. In the end the Attache states that
Denmark is: "Regarded as a prime example of Western Democracy."
The picture is more or less the same during the later part of the 1950s
and most of the way up through the 1960s - the tone actually
becomes more positive during the 1960s.
A lot primarily negative attention is, however, drawn to the pacifist
Radical Liberal Party, the Socialist Peoples' Party (from 1959
onwards) and the Communists. It is due to their reserved attitude
towards NATO, and the socialist views (only Communists and SF)
that these parties are mentioned.
The fact that the Communist Party attracted so much attention is
probably not that surprising, and the same can be said about the
Socialist Folk Party, that had the earlier leader of the Communist
Party, the charismatic Aksel Larsen, as chairman. It is more
interesting that the Radical Liberal Party is so much in focus in the
source material, because their policy is in general mid-centered, and
cannot (at least according to Danish standards) be said to be
socialist. This only stresses that the United States during the period
is heavily focused on Danish defense policies, and not on its
domestic policies.
It, however, also seems to become a less important matter over
time. When the Radical Liberal leader, Hilmar Baunsgaard, becomes
Prime Minster in 1968, it does not create any severe problems
between Denmark and the United States. This is, however, most
likely due to a Radical Liberal softening on the defense issues over
the 1960s-as an analysis from the State Department underlines in
1968 after the election, where the Social Democratic party had been
overthrown: "They [Radical Liberals] are unlikely to change
domestic or foreign policies significantly." 19
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The war in Vietnam, however, seems to weaken the relationship
between the U.S. and Denmark. In general the Johnson
administration still seems to trust the Danish politicians, but it is also
a fact that the voice of the people can be powerful. The embassy
states in 1967: "Criticism, particularly over the bombing of North
Vietnam is widespread, even among pro-American Danes. This
criticism has not yet been endorsed by the government leaders, who
have tried to induce a balanced approach to the problem within the
parameters of a weak domestic political position". 20 Later the
embassy concludes: "The effect of all this 21 has been a slow
consistent deterioration of relations. Most Danes, and the Danish
government, continue to be friendly to the United States, and there is
doubtless a considerable reservoir of good will and even affection, in
addition to an effective working relationship in most areas. Equally
unmistakable, however, is the fact that the ties are loosening." 22
Problems and criticism in relation to the Vietnam War was, however,
a general problem also in domestic American political life, and there
is nothing in the source material to suggest that the problems
concerning the Danish-America political relations around 1966-1968
were long term or unsolvable.
In conclusion there were small disagreements and problems at the
immediate level between the U.S. and Denmark, for example the fact
that Denmark's NATO contribution is smaller than that of many
other comparable countries. On the deeper structural level, however,
there is seemingly no doubt concerning the Danish position.
Denmark is considered a strong and secure ally in terms of the
shared set of human and democratic values between the two
countries.
The Welfare State
From the 1950s onwards the Danish Social Democratic party created
the foundation for the welfare state Denmark is today. Several of the
biggest steps in this process were taken during the 1950s and 1960s.
Many of these initiatives were inspired by a socialist ideology, and
were, as mentioned earlier, in many ways quite far from the values
in the American society-for example high taxation, universal
healthcare, general pension plans, a "large state" with more security
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for especially the poor people, but also less individual freedom. This
fact could possibly lead American analysts to think that Denmark
would be susceptive to Soviet propaganda or that the country slowly
was developing in to a communist type of state. This does not seem
to be the case, however.
In this connection it is worth dwelling a little bit on one of the
most important Danish social laws ever made, and the American
reaction to it-the general pensioning plan from 1956. In September
that year nationwide pensioning became a reality for the first time in
the Danish nation's history. There are only few comments on the
very expensive plan in the American archives - in this connection it
is worth mentioning that the plan resulted in the significant 50
million kroner cut in the defense budget. The American embassy in
Copenhagen concludes that the law will be costly for the Danish
state, and that it is a shame that: "Although strong supporters of this
bill, the Radical Liberals have seized every _opportunity since its
introduction to press their traditional demands for military budget
cuts and reductions in the period of conscript service in order to
finance it". 23 This report in specific or the pensioning plan from 1956
in general, however, never creates a reaction in Washington D.C.,
which shows the strength and amount of trust in the DanishAmerican relations in the late 1950s - Denmark is considered a firm
and strong ally - social laws or a welfare state do not change that
fact.
The picture of a quiet American acceptance of domestic Danish
politics can be seen throughout the 1960s as well. If one looks at
other important and comparable laws during the period the
conclusion is the same. A good example is the large complex of
economic laws in 1961 to 1963, where, for example, the high Danish
sales tax was introduced (the OMS (omscetningsafgift-a sales tax)
and later MOMS (mere omscetningsafgift-more sales tax).

The Social Democratic Party-The Democrats and Republicans
The Social Democratic Party had uninterrupted power in Denmark
from 1953 to 1968 in a long and very decisive period of Denmark's
recent history, Denmark is therefore in many ways shaped by that
party and its policies. It is a party that is normally placed slight to
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the left side of the center in the Danish political spectrum, and
although it is not normally considered pure socialist, it is strongly
inspired by a socialist way of thinking. That fact does not seem to
affect the party and its leaders' relations with the United States,
which seem to be surprisingly good during the period under
investigation here. A 1964 Airgram from the American Embassy in
Copenhagen shows this clearly. William Blair from the Embassy
writes: "The foreign policy objectives of the United States are in
large measure supported by the Social Democratic, Conservative,
and Moderate Liberal Parties. ( ... ) The Radical Liberal Party has
from time to time thrown cold water on the Social Democrats'
willingness to fulfill more adequately Denmark's NATO
obligations." 24 It is even stated in the analysis that it would be best
for America, if Denmark kept some kind of majority or minority
Social Democratic Government, because they act responsibly when
they are in power and have control over the trade unions. In a later
policy assessment, made by the State Department, it is said that
Denmark is a country that by large pursues many of the same
policies and objectives as the United States. The Danish Social
Democratic Prime Minister, Jens Otto Krag, (served from 1962), even
developed a relatively warm relationship with President Johnson.
Before J. 0. Krag's first visit to the United States as Danish Prime
Minister, it is written in President Johnson's memorandum: "He [J.
0 . Krag] left doctrinaire socialism ( ... ) A strong supporter of his
country's pro-Western, pro-NATO and staunchly anti-Communist
foreign policy, J. 0. Krag seems to be favorably disposed toward the
U.S." The base for a friendship between the two was there even
before J. 0. Krag set foot on American soil. 25
It is, however, also concluded in a National Security Council
Report (NSC) that the Conservative and Liberal parties take a
stronger line on increasing defenses and opposing the USSR than the
Social Democratic or Agrarian parties. 26 This insight is not
surprising, though, since the liberal parties in Denmark by nature
are closer to an American ideology of society. On the other hand
several reports also mention that the Social Democratic Party has
stronger and more experienced leaders - so it is very possible that
the American officials, the embassy staff etc. favor the Social
75

Democrats, because then they know what to expect from Denmark.
This is possibly also an important reason why there supposedly is no
measurable difference between the evaluations of Denmark during
democratic and republican administrations respectively. Secondly
has a form of "path dependency" among American government
officials probably also an important role to play in this matter.
Simply due to the fact that the staff at the embassy or in the State
Department influence each other - in many cases the persons that
evaluate Danish domestic politics over the years are the same.
Conclusion
This study has a number of important general connotations seen in
relation to the conclusions of the existing research of the cold war
era as presented earlier, because it provides a somewhat different
view of the Danish-American relations during the period. My
analysis has shown that America should be viewed in a more
passive and non-intervening light in Danish cold wa_r history. If the
focus as for example Poul Villaume is more or less exclusively on the
NA TO and security policies there were considerable conflicts
especially during the 1950s. However, the impression is much more
positive if the perspective is to give an overall characterization of the
civil political relations between the two countries seen from an
American point of view. The American diplomats had a general
understanding and respect for the Danish political system and a
confidence in the general common democratic and humanitarian
goals of the two countries. My analysis indicates that these shared
values were much more important than the exact size of the Danish
NATO budget. This can be explained by the fact that the American
'project' in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was built on a
democratic foundation, which allowed Denmark considerable
domestic political latitude - it was in other words an "Empire by
Invitation" 27 more than by force. Therefore, Denmark supposedly
did not depend on a strategic alliance between the US
administrations and the Danish Social Democratic party in order to
keep good relations as Bo Lidegaard argues. However, it is fair to
say that a more detailed analysis seen on a more general European
scale is necessary to finally confirm or reject Lidegaard' s hypothesis.
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